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LAWYERING DECISIONS—OCTOBER 2009 TERM
Eileen Kaufman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many Supreme Court observers have commented on the unusual number of cases decided last Term that involved some aspect of
lawyering. 1 In fact, one commentator described the phenomenon as
“ ‘nothing short of a revolution.’ ” 2 Whether it qualifies as a revolution or not, it is certainly notable that the Supreme Court’s “incredible shrinking docket” included as many cases as it did that directly
impacted the practice of law. These lawyering cases fall roughly into
four categories: bad lawyering cases, First Amendment cases, attorney’s fees cases, and timing cases. This discussion focuses on the
civil cases in these categories.
II.

BAD LAWYERING CASES

The focus of this first category is Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA. 3 The issue in this case was whether
the bona fide error defense to civil liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 4 (“FDCPA”) applied to good faith mistakes of

*

Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. LL.M. and J.D., New York University School of
Law; B.A., Skidmore College. This Article is based on a presentation given at the TwentySecond Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review Program held in Central Islip, New
York on November 5, 2010.
1
See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Lawyering Suits Pile up at High Court, NAT’L L.J., July 6, 2010,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202463292471
(characterizing the sixteen lawyering cases—“nearly [twenty] percent of the Court’s decision
docket”—as “an unusually large number”).
2
Id. (quoting Professor Renee Knake of Michigan State University College of Law).
3
130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010). It is not entirely fair to categorize this as a case of “bad
lawyering.” Rather, the case involved a good faith but ultimately incorrect interpretation of
the law. See id. at 1610.
4
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692p (2010).
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law. 5 The law firm, Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA
(“Carlisle”), sought foreclosure of a mortgage and sent a complaint to
the homeowner with a notice telling the homeowner that she had to
dispute the debt in writing within thirty days or the debt would be assumed. 6 The debt had already been paid in full, however, and Carlisle withdrew the foreclosure action. 7 The homeowner then brought
an action against Carlisle alleging that the practice of requiring a debtor to dispute the debt in writing was itself a violation of the
FDCPA. 8
The trial court agreed that Carlisle had violated the statute by
requiring the debtor to dispute the debt in writing, although it acknowledged that there was a conflict of authority on that question. 9
Therefore, the issue became whether or not Carlisle was protected
from liability by the bona fide error defense. 10 The Supreme Court
held that the defense does not apply to a misinterpretation of the
law—not even a good faith, reasonable misinterpretation of the law. 11
Therefore, lawyers are subject to liability for violations of the Act,
even when they are acting upon a misreading of the requirements of
the Act.
What makes the case so important is the effect that it will
have on debt-collecting lawyers. The decision puts lawyers in a difficult situation because the threat of personal liability could interfere
with the lawyer’s obligation to zealously advocate on behalf of the
client. For example, an attorney may be faced with a situation where
there is ambiguity as to the Act’s meaning. One way to interpret the
ambiguity benefits the client, but if the attorney chooses that interpre5

Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608 (“This case presents the question whether the ‘bona fide
error’ defense . . . applies to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s mistaken
interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.”).
6
Id. at 1609.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1609-10 (“While acknowledging a division of authority on the question, the
[d]istrict [c]ourt held that Carlisle had violated § 1692(g) by requiring Jerman to dispute the
debt in writing.”).
10
Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610. The district court found that the bona fide error defense
shielded Carlisle from liability and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. Recognizing the existence
of a circuit split on this issue, the Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of
authority as to the scope of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense.” Id.
11
Id. at 1611 (“We have long recognized the ‘common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.’ ” (quoting
Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833))).
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tation and is wrong, then the attorney faces personal liability. This
creates a conflict of interest between the attorney’s personal financial
liability and the attorney’s ethical obligation to zealously advocate on
behalf of the client.
That is the concern of the two dissenting justices in the case—
Justices Kennedy and Alito—who said:
When statutory provisions have not yet been interpreted in a definitive way, principled advocacy is to be
prized, not punished.
An attorney’s obligation in the face of uncertainty is to give the client his or her best professional
assessment of the law’s mandate.
....
. . . Henceforth, creditors’ attorneys of the highest ethical standing are encouraged to adopt a debtor-friendly
interpretation of every question, lest the attorneys
themselves incur personal financial risk. 12
One way out of that dilemma was suggested by Justice Breyer
in a concurring opinion. 13 Attorneys who seek an advisory opinion
from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and follow the opinion
are insulated, by statute, from liability. 14 The dissenting justices,
however, believed that was an impractical solution to a serious problem of professional ethics. 15
III.

FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
A.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project

The second category concerns First Amendment cases that
have a direct impact on the actual practice of law. One of the most
closely watched cases of the Term, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro12

Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1625 (Breyer, J., concurring).
14
Id.
15
Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Justice Breyer’s] argument
misconceives the practical realities of litigation. Filings and motions are made under
pressing time constraints; arguments must be offered quickly in reply; and strategic decisions
must be taken in the face of incomplete information. Lawyers in practice would not consider
this alternative at all realistic, particularly where the defense is needed most.”).
13
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ject 16 was the first post-September 11th case to address First
Amendment rights in the context of national security. At issue in
Holder was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 17 which prohibits providing “material support or resources” to
foreign organizations designated as terrorist organizations. 18 According to the statute, “material support” includes financial services,
training, and expert advice or assistance. 19 But does the statute apply
to attorneys who are looking to support the legal, non-violent work of
these organizations?
Ralph Fertig, one of the named plaintiffs in the case, spent his
early years participating in the civil rights movement. 20 Fifty years
later, as president of the Humanitarian Law Project, he wanted to advocate for what he perceived to be another oppressed minority, the
Kurds in Turkey. More specifically, the Humanitarian Law Project
wanted to support the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”) 21 by training members of the organization to use humanitarian and international law to resolve disputes. 22 The proposed support would also include teaching PKK members how to petition bodies, like the United
Nations, for relief. 23 The Court ruled against Humanitarian Law
Project, six-to-three, 24 rejecting Fertig’s argument that the application
of the material support statute to those activities violates the First

16

130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.A.).
18
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010)).
19
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010) (defining the term “material support or
resources”).
20
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714. Fertig is a seventy-nine-year-old lawyer, a retired federal
administrative law judge, a professor at the University of Southern California, and the
President of a human rights organization called the Humanitarian Law Project. See Adam
Liptak, Right to Free Speech Collides with Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010,
at A18. In his earlier days, he participated in the civil rights movement, joined the Freedom
Rides, and was arrested and beaten in a Selma, Alabama jail. See id.
21
The PKK was one of thirty groups designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign
terrorist organization. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg.
52,650-01 (Oct. 8, 1997).
22
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
23
Id. (noting that plaintiffs challenged the statute’s validity on the basis that it prohibited
them from engaging in certain specified activities, including training PKK members to use
international law to resolve disputes peacefully; teaching PKK members to petition the
United Nations and other representative bodies for relief).
24
See id. at 2712.
17
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Amendment. 25 Fertig risks fifteen years in prison if he engages in the
activities that he proposed. 26
This decision will profoundly affect lawyers involved in this
type of work. Some have said it puts international peace organizations “in a very odd situation.” 27 Former President Jimmy Carter said
the ruling “inhibits the work of human rights and conflict resolution
groups” whose work requires them to “interact directly with groups
that have engaged in violence.” 28 In fact, some have speculated that
lawyers, including President Carter, could be prosecuted for training
parties like Hezbollah or Hamas in Lebanon or Gaza in fair election
practices. 29 Others have said that organizations like Catholic Relief
Services could be prosecuted for conducting programs that “teach terrorist organizations how to demobilize their weapons, enter into an
electoral process, or engage antagonistic religious groups in discussion.” 30
Is filing an amicus brief on behalf of a terrorist organization a
violation of the statute that can subject a lawyer to criminal prosecution? At oral argument, former Solicitor General Elena Kagan argued that doing so would violate the statute. 31 Whether she is right is
unclear from reading the decision, but it would likely be covered by
the Act, at least if it was coordinated in some way with the organization. The Act would certainly be violated if an amicus brief was filed
25

See id. at 2725-26, 2730-31 (recognizing Congress’s national security concerns in
passing the statute and holding that the statute does not violate freedom of speech and
freedom of association).
26
Id. at 2713 n.1. After the decision was announced, Fertig said that his organization will
“continue its peaceful advocacy work, ‘but [it] do[es] so with great fear.’ ” Tony Mauro,
‘Material Support’ Ruling May Break 1st Amendment Ground, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CTR.
(June 22, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=23079.
27
George A. Lopez, a professor at the University of Notre Dame’s Krok Institute for
International Peace Studies, said: “ ‘We’re allowed to work with the Colombian bishops, but
we’re not allowed to work with them in the same room when they are working’ (with groups
on the terrorist list).” Adeshina Emmanuel, Supreme Court Ruling Could Obstruct Peace
Work, AMERICANCATHOLIC.ORG (July 20, 2010), http://www.americancatholic.org/news/
report. aspx?id=2867.
28
Supreme Court Rules “Material Support” Law Can Stand, ACLU (June 21, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-material-support-law-can-stand.
29
See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 26 (speculating that former President Carter could be
prosecuted for meeting with Hamas and Hezbollah to encourage fair elections).
30
See Current Comment, AMERICA, July 19, 2010, available at http://www.america
magazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=12387.
31
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2719 (noting the Government’s statement that the statute “would
bar filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization”).
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at the direction of the organization.
Although the Court took pains to distinguish providing material support, which is prohibited by the Act, from what it called “independent advocacy,” which is not, the dividing line remains unclear. 32
B.

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States 33 challenged two provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 34 as applied to lawyers. 35 The threshold issue
for the Court was whether the Act applied to lawyers. 36 This question was dependent on whether lawyers constitute “debt relief agencies.” 37 Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous court, had little
difficulty concluding that attorneys do qualify as “debt relief agencies” based on a plain reading of the text. 38
This conclusion leads to the two First Amendment issues in
the case. The first was whether a provision of the Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 526, which prohibits attorneys from advising clients to incur more
debt, violates the First Amendment. 39 The answer depends on how
narrowly or broadly the statute is interpreted. The Court upheld the
provision by adopting a narrow reading, construing the statute to prohibit only advice to a debtor to incur more debt, because the debtor is
filing for bankruptcy rather than for another valid purpose. 40 In other
words, the statute precludes advising a debtor to load up on debt because the debt would be discharged in bankruptcy, but it does not
prohibit other advice. For example, an attorney can advise a debtor
to “refinance a mortgage or purchase a reliable car prior to filing because doing so will reduce the debtor’s interest rates or improve [the

32

Id. at 2721-22.
130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
34
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 18 and 28 U.S.C.A.).
35
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1330-31.
36
Id. at 1331 (stating that certiorari was granted to determine the scope of the statute).
37
Id. (“We first consider whether the term ‘debt relief agency’ includes attorneys.”).
38
Id. at 1333.
39
Id. at 1329.
40
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336 (concluding that advising a client to “load up” on debt is
prohibited “conduct that is abusive per se”).
33
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client’s] ability to repay.” 41 That advice is not prohibited by the Act
because “the promise of enhanced financial prospects, rather than the
anticipated filing, is the impelling cause.” 42 Other permissible advice
includes advising the debtor “to incur additional debt to buy groceries, pay medical bills, or make other purchases ‘reasonably necessary for [his or her] support or maintenance.’ ” 43
Also, the prohibition does not prevent a lawyer from discussing the issue of incurring more debt with his or her client. 44 This, the
Court concludes, is consistent with ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.2, which distinguishes between lawyers counseling a client
to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct and simply discussing the
legal consequences of engaging in a particular act. 45
The second provision of the Act that was challenged was the
disclosure requirement. 46 Section 528 requires attorney advertisements to state that the advertiser is a debt relief agency and that the
services being offered may include bankruptcy. 47 Whether or not
that disclosure requirement is constitutional depends on how the
speech is characterized. Normally, restrictions on commercial speech
are evaluated pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny test. 48 But that test
only applies if the regulated speech is not misleading and does not
advocate unlawful conduct. 49 Here, the Court concluded that because
the statute is directed at misleading speech, and because it is a disclosure requirement rather than a limitation on speech, the governing

41

Id. at 1339 n.6.
Id.
43
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (West 2010)).
44
Id. at 1338.
45
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1338. “Against this backdrop, it is hard to see how a rule that
narrowly prohibits an attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of
abusive prefiling conduct could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client
relationship.” Id.
46
Id. at 1339.
47
11 U.S.C.A. § 528 (West 2010). Subsection (b) governs “advertisement[s] of
bankruptcy assistance services.” Id.
48
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that “[the
Court] engages in ‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech”); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (stating
that restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must
“directly advanc[e]’ a substantial governmental interest and be ‘n[o] more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest”).
49
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
42
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test is mere rational basis review. 50
The Court analogized the issue to that in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 51 where the
Court upheld a professional responsibility rule that requires lawyers
who advertise contingency fee services to disclose that a losing client
could be responsible for litigation costs and fees. 52 Using parallel rationale, the Court reasoned in Milavetz that the disclosure requirements were simply aimed at combating inherently misleading commercial advertisements. 53 Applying the rational basis test, the Court
easily concluded that the challenged disclosure requirements were
reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing deception of consumers. 54
Interestingly, Justice Scalia wrote separately to voice his disagreement with footnote three of the majority opinion, which cited to
legislative history consisting of a report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary. 55 The report was cited to support the majority’s conclusion that the Act’s purpose was to address abusive practices of
lawyers and other bankruptcy professionals. 56 Justice Scalia refused
to indulge “the extravagant assumption that Members of the House
other than members of its Committee on the Judiciary read the Report
(and the further extravagant assumption that they agreed with it.)” 57
And as for the President, he “surely had more important things to

50
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (stating that “[u]njustified or unduly burdensome
disclosure requirements offend the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers’ ” (emphasis
added) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985))).
51
471 U.S. 626.
52
Id. at 651.
53
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1344.
54
Id. at 1341. The Court also distinguished the case from In re R.M.J. See id. at 1344.
That case concerned ethical rules prohibiting lawyers from advertising their practice areas in
any other terms than those prescribed by the state supreme court and from advertising the
courts in which they were admitted to practice. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193 (1982).
Intermediate scrutiny was applied to strike down the rules at issue in In re R.M.J. because
the restricted statements were not inherently misleading. See id. at 205-06.
55
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1332 n.3.
56
Id. (“Statements in a Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary regarding the
Act’s purpose indicate concern with abusive practices undertaken by attorneys as well as
other bankruptcy professionals.”).
57
Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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do.” 58 Justice Scalia chastised the Court for relying on legislative
history to support a completely unambiguous statute, a practice he
feared conscientious lawyers may mimic and repeat. 59
Justice Thomas also wrote separately to express his view that
the test for evaluating commercial speech should not turn on whether
the regulation compels speech or restricts speech. 60 Thus, Justice
Thomas calls for a reexamination of Zauderer to determine whether it
provides sufficient protection against government mandated disclosures of commercial speech. 61
The Second Circuit decided a similar case several months after Milavetz. In Connecticut Bar Association v. United States, 62 the
Second Circuit held that attorneys are subject to other disclosure requirements contained in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, in addition to those upheld in Milavetz. 63 The
additional disclosure requirements mandate that attorneys provide
certain notices and disclosures about bankruptcy 64 and require a written contract that clearly explains the services the attorney would provide, as well as the fees. 65
IV.

ATTORNEY’S FEES CASES

There were three pertinent attorney’s fees cases this past
Term, each arising under a different fee-shifting statute: the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), the Employee Retirement Security
Act (“ERISA”), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act.66
This discussion focuses on the cases concerning the first two statutes,

58

Id.
Id. (“Our cases have said that legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory text is
clear. . . . [footnote three] advises conscientious attorneys that this is not true, and that they
must spend time and their clients’ treasure combing the annals of legislative history in all
cases . . . .”).
60
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1343 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61
Id. (“Accordingly, I would be willing to reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an
appropriate case to determine whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment
protection against government-mandated disclosures.”).
62
620 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2010).
63
Id. at 95-96.
64
Id. at 96.
65
Id. at 100.
66
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d) (West 2010); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1) (West 2010); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2010).
59

94

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

but Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 67 which concerns 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, is discussed elsewhere.
A.

Astrue v. Ratliff

In Astrue v. Ratliff, 68 the Court considered whether the fees
awarded under EAJA are payable to the party-litigant or to the attorney. 69 This is significant because if the fees are payable to the party,
then a pre-existing debt that the party owes to the government can be
offset against the fee award. Unfortunately for lawyers, the statute
clearly states that the fees are payable to the party, and that is what a
unanimous Supreme Court concluded. 70
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
authored a concurring opinion. 71 They wrote separately to point out
that offsetting the fee against pre-existing debts of the party undercuts
the effectiveness of EAJA. 72 The purpose of this fee-shifting statute
is to enable individuals who have been wronged by the government
to find a lawyer to challenge unreasonable governmental conduct.73
It is designed, as its name suggests, to enhance access to justice by
providing a mechanism for people of limited means to find a lawyer. 74 While the concurring justices agreed with the majority’s textual analysis, 75 their concurrence is an explicit invitation to Congress
to reconsider applying the offset rules to EAJA fee awards.
But until Congress accepts that invitation, those most likely to
be affected by this decision are lawyers who represent clients in so67

130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
69
Id. at 2524 (“We consider whether an award of ‘fees and other expenses’ to a
‘prevailing party’ under § 2412(d) is payable to the litigant or to his attorney.”).
70
Id. (“We hold that a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigants and is therefore
subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United
States.”). In this case, the attorney attempted to avoid this result by relying on the
government’s longstanding practice of paying EAJA awards directly to the lawyer of a case.
See id. at 2524-25. However, that practice existed prior to 2005, at which time the Treasury
Department decided that fees awarded under the EAJA are payable to the client, and subject
to offset if the client owes money to the government. See id. Since then, the government
only makes direct payment of fees to attorneys after checking that the party does not have
any outstanding debts to the government. Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
71
See id. at 2529-33 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
72
Id. at 2530 (opining that “such offsets undercut the effectiveness of the EAJA”).
73
Id.
74
See id. at 2531.
75
Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
68
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cial security cases and veterans cases—including law school clinics,
which often engage in this representation. Twelve thousand civil actions are filed each year to challenge denials of social security benefits, a figure that represents five percent of all civil filings in federal
court. 76 That figure does not include the number of veterans cases
filed each year. Clients who have been denied social security or veterans benefits are often unable to afford private counsel, and the
amount of money at issue is often too small for a contingency fee arrangement. The EAJA enables these individuals to find lawyers to
challenge the government’s determination. Astrue will remove the
incentive for lawyers to take these cases because, even if successful,
the fee may be completely swallowed up by the offset. The attorney
representing Ratliff observed that “these cases generally are handled
by solo practitioners, and ‘far from getting rich handling them, the
awards barely pay overhead, considering that EAJA rates are capped
at what are typically below market rates.’ ” 77
Section 1988 uses comparable language to EAJA. 78 If this result is applied to § 1988, it will significantly undercut the concept of
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, which is intended to enable private lawyers to act as private attorney generals and make
possible the vindication of important federal rights. 79
Another important aspect of this case relates to how often the
government is wrong in social security and veterans cases. At oral
argument, the Court learned that the government’s position was
found to be unjustified in seventy percent of veterans appeals and forty-two percent of social security appeals. 80 These statistics led Chief
Justice Roberts to remark, “Well, that’s really startling, isn’t it? In
litigating with veterans, the government more often than not takes a
position that is substantially unjustified?” 81 Chief Justice Roberts
was right to be startled. But, perversely, by permitting the offset
76

Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, Astrue, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (No. 08-1322), 2010
WL 197356.
77
Marcia Coyle, High Court Lets Government Take Fee Awards for Clients’ Debts,
NAT’L L.J., June 14, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202462695027&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
78
Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b).
79
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a).
80
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Astrue, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (No. 08-1322), 2010 WL
603696.
81
Id. at 52.

96

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

rules to be applied to EAJA fees, the Astrue decision makes it harder
to challenge these erroneous and substantially unjustified determinations.
B.

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. 82 answered the
question of whether the fees in an ERISA action are only payable to a
prevailing party. 83 Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court,
rejected the view that only prevailing parties are eligible for fees, and
instead held that a court has the discretion to award fees “as long as
the fee claimant has achieved ‘some degree of success of the merits.’ ” 84 While this “case may not captivate the media and public[,]
. . . plaintiffs file about 10,000 lawsuits for ERISA benefits annually
and they are expensive cases to litigate,” thus, the decision has tremendous significance. 85
Bridget Hardt worked for a textile manufacturer and applied
for disability benefits when she developed carpal tunnel syndrome.86
Reliance, the insurance company, administered the employer’s longterm disability plan. 87 Reliance initially denied Ms. Hardt’s claim, 88
but subsequently reversed itself and awarded temporary disability
benefits for twenty-four months. 89 Meanwhile, Ms. Hardt developed
new symptoms and was diagnosed with small-fiber neuropathy. 90
She applied for and received social security disability benefits, 91 but
Ms. Hardt was unable to convince Reliance that she was totally disabled and entitled to long-term disability benefits. She sued Reliance
under ERISA. 92
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and both motions
82

130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
Id. at 2152 (analyzing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1), which governs fee-shifting in an
ERISA action).
84
Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).
85
Marcia Coyle, High Court Faces Blockbuster Cases as Stevens’ Retirement Nears,
NAT’L L.J., Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120245
3173828.
86
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2152.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 2153.
91
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2153.
92
Id.
83
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were denied by the district court. 93 But, notably, the district court
found “ ‘compelling evidence’ . . . that ‘Ms. Hardt [wa]s totally disabled due to her neuropathy.’ ” 94 The district court “was ‘inclined to
rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor,’ ” but chose to give Reliance the opportunity “ ‘to address the deficiencies in its approach.’ ” 95 The district
court believed a remand was appropriate because “ ‘[t]his case
presents one of those scenarios where the plan administrator has
failed to comply with the ERISA guidelines,’ meaning ‘Ms. Hardt did
not get the kind of review to which she was entitled under applicable
law.’ ” 96 Therefore, the court instructed Reliance to act on Ms.
Hardt’s application within thirty days, “[o]therwise . . . judgment
[would] be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.” 97 Reliance did as instructed and determined Ms. Hardt was eligible for long-term disability benefits. 98
Ms. Hardt then sought and obtained attorney’s fees, but the
Fourth Circuit reversed the fee award because Ms. Hardt was not a
prevailing party. 99 In reaching that result, the Fourth Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court’s definition of prevailing party, “under which a
fee claimant qualifies as a ‘prevailing party’ only if he has obtained
an ‘enforceable judgmen[t] on the merits’ or a ‘court-ordered consent
decre[e].’ ” 100 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s remand order did not qualify as an enforceable judgment on the merits
because it “ ‘did not require Reliance to award benefits . . . .’ ”101
Therefore, Ms. Hardt was not a prevailing party and was not eligible
for fees. 102
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that unlike so many other fee-shifting statutes, the ERISA provision does not utilize the term
“prevailing party,” and it is therefore error to restrict fees to those
93

Id. at 2154 (“The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of which the
[d]istrict [c]ourt denied.”).
94
Id. (alteration in original).
95
Id. (citations omitted).
96
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2154 (alteration in original).
97
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 2155 (noting that the “[d]istrict [c]ourt granted Hardt’s motion . . . . and the
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals vacated the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s order . . . . [because Ms. Hardt] failed to
establish that she was a ‘prevailing party’ ”).
100
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)).
101
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2155.
102
Id.
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who would qualify only as prevailing parties. 103
The Court then attempted to determine under what circumstances a party is entitled to fees. 104 In answering that question, the
Court rejected the five-factor test used by the district court and many
circuit courts. 105 Instead, the Supreme Court relied on cases that interpreted other fee-shifting statutes, such as ERISA, that are not limited to prevailing parties. 106 The standard adopted by the Court required that the plaintiff “show ‘some degree of success on the merits’
before a court may award attorney’s fees.” 107 This standard, however, cannot be met if the claimant only received some “ ‘trivial success
on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y].’ ” 108 The claimant
does satisfy the standard “if the court can fairly call the outcome of
the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a ‘lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party’s success
was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central issue.’ ” 109
In applying that standard to the facts here, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to fees. 110 After all, the plaintiff
persuaded the district court that Reliance had failed to comply with
103

Id. The Court elaborated:
Because Congress failed to include in § 1132(g)(1) an express ‘prevailing party’ limit on the availability of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals’ decision adding that term of art to a fee-shifting statute from
which it is conspicuously absent more closely resembles ‘invent[ing] a
statute rather than interpret[ing] one.’
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005)).
104
Id. at 2156.
105
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158. These five factors used by several district courts included:
“(1) the degree of opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of
opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an
award of attorneys’ fees against the opposing parties would deter other
persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding
ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.”
Id. at 2154 n.1 (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1029 (4th
Cir. 1993)). The Court, however, found that the five factors bore “no obvious relation” to
the text of the statute and were therefore “not required for channeling a court’s discretion
when awarding fees under this section.” Id. at 2158.
106
Id. at 2157. The Court chose to rely upon Ruckelshaus in interpreting the meaning of
§ 1132(g)(1). Id.
107
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694).
108
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9).
109
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9).
110
Id. at 2159.
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ERISA. Although the district court did not grant her motion for
summary judgment, it nevertheless found compelling evidence that
she was totally disabled and stated that it was inclined to rule in her
favor, 111 but would give Reliance another opportunity to get it right.
This clearly amounted to success on the merits entitling her to attorney’s fees. 112
This decision unquestionably makes it easier to obtain attorney’s fees—at least in the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits,
which have all required prevailing party status. 113 Making it easier to
obtain attorney’s fees is consistent with the twin goals of the ERISA
fee shifting statute—discouraging frivolous claim denials and enabling claimants to secure legal representation, even when their claims
are small. 114
The decision, however, leaves open several questions, including: (1) whether a remand order without more constitutes some success on the merits; (2) what actually constitutes “some degree of success on the merits”; and (3) under what circumstances can the fivepart test actually be used? The Court maintained that the five-part
test is not required because it “bear[s] no obvious relation to [the statutory] text or to [the Court’s] fee-shifting jurisprudence.” 115 But, in
a pesky footnote, the Court said: “We do not foreclose the possibility
that once a claimant has satisfied this requirement [of some degree of
success on the merits], and thus becomes eligible for a fees award . . .
a court may consider the five factors . . . in deciding whether to award
attorney’s fees.” 116 This statement muddies the waters. The fivefactor test is not required, yet the possibility remains that a court can
use the test in exercising its discretion to award fees under the Act. It
is fairly certain that there is going to be more litigation regarding this
issue. Many commentators have expressed concern that “after a sig111

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664 (E.D. Va. 2008).
See id.
113
See, e.g., Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Emps. of Champion Int’l
Corp., 545 F.3d 555, 564 (7th Cir. 2008); Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501
F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d
1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997); Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 226
(1st Cir. 1996).
114
The fee award in Hardt ($58,920) was larger than the benefits awarded ($55,250).
Marcia Coyle, High Court Smooths Path to Plaintiff Fees in Disability Cases, LAW.COM
(May 25, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202458721510.
115
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158.
116
Id. at 2158 n.8 (emphasis added).
112
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nificant battle over benefits, the new rule may result in a second
round of litigation over attorney’s fees.” 117
V.

CASES INVOLVING ISSUES OF TIMING
A.

Mohawk v. Carpenter

The first case in this category was Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.
Carpenter, 118 a case that provided the occasion for Justice Sotomayor’s first decision—and a unanimous one. 119 The question before
the Court was whether a disclosure order adverse to the attorneyclient privilege is immediately appealable. 120 The Court’s answer
was a resounding no. 121
Norman Carpenter worked at a carpet mill and supervised approximately one hundred carpet factory workers. 122 His path to the
Supreme Court began after he sent a series of e-mails to the company’s human resources department complaining that Mohawk, his employer, was hiring “undocumented immigrants.” 123 Unbeknownst to
Carpenter, Mohawk was already the defendant in a racketeering class
action alleging that Mohawk knowingly hired undocumented workers
in order to drive down the wages of its legal employees. 124 Carpenter
was then summoned to speak with Mohawk’s RICO lawyer. 125 Carpenter alleged that during this conversation, he was pressured to re117

See, e.g., Andrew O. Bunn & Stephanie J. Cohen, New Fee-Shifting Regime Under
ERISA in Wake of “Hardt,” N.Y. L.J., July 22, 2010 (stating that there is a likely result of “a
second round of litigation over attorney’s fees” because the some degree of success
“standard is ambiguous and will require additional litigation to specify the point at which the
degree of success is so insignificant that an award of attorney’s fees would be an abuse of
discretion”).
118
130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
119
See id. at 602.
120
Id. at 603.
121
See id. at 609 (holding that “the collateral order doctrine does not extend to disclosure
orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” because “[e]ffective appellate review can be
had by other means”).
122
Id. at 603.
123
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603. Justice Sotomayor’s use of the term “undocumented
immigrants,” as opposed to “illegal aliens,” prompted considerable attention from the press
due to the fact that this was the first time that the term appeared in a Supreme Court
decision. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Draws Retort From a Fellow Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, at A24.
124
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603. See also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp.
2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
125
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603.
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tract his charge, and as a result of his refusal to retract, he was
fired. 126 Carpenter then sued Mohawk, claiming that his firing was
unlawful under both state and federal law. 127
In discovery, Carpenter sought information about his firing,
including information regarding his interview with Mohawk’s counsel. 128 Mohawk resisted, claiming that this information was protected
under the attorney-client privilege.129 The district court agreed but
found that the privilege had been waived when Mohawk revealed certain information in the RICO litigation. 130 Mohawk appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit, which dismissed the appeal, holding that discovery
orders relating to attorney-client privilege are not collateral orders
subject to immediate appeal. 131
One interesting aspect of this case is the way different constituencies lined up before the Supreme Court. The groups supporting
immediate appealability were business interests and the American
Bar Association. 132 These groups argued that district court judges often decide privilege questions improperly and maintained that once
privileged material is produced in discovery, the consequences can
never be undone. 133 Indeed, Mohawk’s attorney stated that waiting
until final judgment to appeal the discovery order would, in effect,
make the appeal unreviewable because there is “ ‘no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure.’ ” 134
The opposing briefs included one from former federal judges
and a group of law professors. 135 This group argued that permitting
126

Id.
Id.
128
Id. at 604.
129
Id.
130
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 604.
131
Id.
132
See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 1245114; Brief for The Voice of the
Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08678), 2009 WL 1206221; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678),
2009 WL 1263621.
133
See Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 132, at 20 (maintaining that judges
have profound differences of opinion on this subject and thus, “questions of waiver must be
answered correctly if the privilege is to retain its vitality”).
134
Brief for Petitioner at 25, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 1155404
(quoting In re Ford, 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997)).
135
Former United States Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Starr and Dean and Professor of
Law Erwin Chemerinsky submitted an opposing brief. See Brief for Former Article III
127

102

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

interlocutory appeals would undermine the ability of district court
judges to control discovery and would also overwhelm already overburdened circuit courts. 136 While then Solicitor General Kagan argued against immediate appeals of adverse attorney-client rulings,
she took pains to distinguish certain governmental privileges, such as
the presidential communications privilege and the state’s secrets privilege. 137 These privileges, she asserted, are so fundamental to the
operation of government as to require immediate appeal. 138
At oral argument, Mohawk’s attorney, Randall L. Allen, Esq.,
emphasized the importance of the attorney-client privilege, characterizing it as a “central element of the administration of justice.” 139
This argument, however, was met with considerable skepticism from
the Court. 140 Justice Scalia said: “Mr. Allen, except for the fact that
you and I are lawyers, do you really think that the . . . confidentiality
right is any more important to the proper functioning of society than,
let’s say, the protection of trade secrets[,]” such as a judge ordering
the release of the formula for Coca-Cola? 141 On the other hand,
Chief Justice Roberts pointed to the brief submitted by the American
Bar Association, which he characterized as a representation of “how
the people affected . . . , the lawyers, view the value of the privilege
and what will happen to it.” 142 Professor Judith Resnick, arguing for
Carpenter, replied by citing the brief submitted by lawyers, judges,
and law professors. 143 Chief Justice Roberts dismissively replied:
“Oh, but . . . the law professors aren’t the ones who deal with this
question on a day-to-day basis and have to worry about going to jail .
. . .” 144
Despite the disagreements reflected in the oral argument, the
Court unanimously ruled against immediate appeals of adverse attorJudges and Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct.
599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 2040423.
136
Id. at 3.
137
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, Mohawk,
130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 2028902.
138
See id.
139
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL
3169419.
140
See id. at 3-4.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 38-39.
143
Id. at 39 (stating that judges and law professors “are committed to understanding that
the privilege is important instrumentally”).
144
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 139, at 39.
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ney-client privilege rulings. 145 In its reasoning, the Court emphasized
the importance of keeping the number of collateral rulings that are
immediately appealable small. 146 Justice Sotomayor stated that
“[p]ermitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of
all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution
of district court litigation and needlessly burden the [c]ourts of
[a]ppeals.” 147 She acknowledged the importance of the attorneyclient privilege, but said the question does not turn on the importance
of the interest in the abstract. 148 Rather, “[t]he crucial question . . . is
whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest
as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class
of relevant orders.” 149
Justice Sotomayor concluded that post-judgment appeals suffice to assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. 150 “Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material
in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary
rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new
trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from
evidence.” 151 Other ways of securing appellate review also exist: a
party can seek a discretionary appeal, petition the court of appeals for
a writ of mandamus, or the party can simply defy the disclosure order
and be held in contempt, which, if characterized as criminal punishment, would itself be directly appealable. 152
Although the New York Times dubbed Mohawk a minor decision, 153 it is anything but minor as it relates to lawyering issues.
Much has been written since the decision about the importance of
thinking about the way in which internal investigations are conducted, what communications between counsel and company em145

Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 609.
Id. at 605-06.
147
Id. at 608.
148
Id. at 606.
149
Id.
150
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 607-08.
151
Id. at 606-07.
152
Id. at 607-08. This last option, incurring court-imposed sanctions by being held in
contempt, prompted one critic of the decision to admonish lawyers litigating this issue to
“carry a toothbrush” to court. Editorial, Pack a Toothbrush, 198 N.J. L.J. 974 (Dec. 21,
2009).
153
Liptak, supra note 123, at A24 (noting that the only interesting aspect of Mohawk was
Justice Sotomayor’s use of the term “undocumented immigrant”).
146

104

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

ployees will be privileged, and even when privileged, what will constitute a waiver. 154 One lawyer stated the decision could be viewed
“as creating a new Miranda warning, but this time for . . . attorneys
who conduct internal investigations and handle litigation: anything
you write, say or learn in an interview could, and might, be revealed
to your opposing counsel and be used against your client.” 155 Any
appeal of an adverse ruling on the privilege will have to await final
judgment. 156 But by then, can the toothpaste be squeezed back into
the tube? One litigation specialist suggested that the decision is likely to lead to more settlements, at least where the information ordered
disclosed amounts to something of a smoking gun. 157 If, for example, the information revealed that Carpenter was indeed fired for
complaining about his employer hiring undocumented workers, the
adverse ruling on the attorney-client privilege would likely motivate
the employer to settle the case. 158
Three days after Mohawk was decided, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Mohawk should be extended to a First Amendment
privilege ruling. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 159 the case challenging
California’s Proposition 8 barring gay marriage, the court assumed
“without deciding that discovery orders denying claims of First
Amendment privilege are not reviewable under the collateral doctrine.” 160 Instead, the court relied on mandamus jurisdiction to hear
the case. This decision serves as a reminder that there are many open
questions about whether Mohawk will preclude collateral appeals of
other discovery rulings.

154

See, e.g., Checklists for Corporate Counsel, CKLCORPC § 10.1, Corporate internal
investigations: A checklist for compliance (May 2010); Renee Newman Knake, The
Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or
Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499 (2010).
155
Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Rejects Early Appeals of Attorney-Client Privilege
Determinations, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1202436175573 (quoting Michael Lackey, Co-Chairman of Mayer Brown’s ElectronicDiscovery and Records-Management Practice).
156
Id.
157
Neal R. Troum, Mohawk Industries: A Pragmatic Decision, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 9, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 4911378.
158
Id.
159
591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010).
160
Id. at 1152, 1156.
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Lewis v. City of Chicago

In order to properly analyze Lewis v. City of Chicago, 161 two
earlier and extremely controversial cases must first be discussed:
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 162 and Ricci v. DeStefano. 163
In Ledbetter, the Court dismissed as untimely Lilly Ledbetter’s claim that her employer violated Title VII 164 by paying her significantly less than its male employees. 165 The Court held that her
claim was untimely because it was not brought promptly after the
employer initially made the discriminatory pay decision. 166 The fact
that Ledbetter had no conceivable way of knowing that she was being
paid less than her male colleagues at the time did not seem to matter
to the Court. 167 The Court refused to treat each discriminatory paycheck that she received as a present violation. 168 Instead, the Court
maintained that each paycheck was merely the result of a past act of
discrimination. 169 The Court said the current effects of prior discrimination have “ ‘no present legal consequences.’ ” 170
The second case that requires referencing was the 2009, fiveto-four decision, Ricci. 171 In Ricci, the Court ruled in favor of Cauca161

130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, as recognized in Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F.
Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
163
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
164
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2010)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, and
national origin).
165
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621-22, 632.
166
Id. at 632.
167
See id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the plaintiff was unable
to know of the pay disparities at the time of the pay decision because of their concealment).
168
Id. at 637 (majority opinion).
169
Id.
170
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977)) (stating that “current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged
discrimination”). This decision was highly controversial, so much so that it played a role in
the 2008 presidential election. Lilly Ledbetter appeared onstage at the Democratic National
Convention and appeared at Obama’s side as he signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Play Act of
2009 into law. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1783967. This Act legislatively overruled the
Ledbetter decision and restored the paycheck accrual rule for pay discrimination claims. See
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
171
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663 (dissenting in this case were Justices Ginsburg, Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer).
162
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sian firefighters who sued the City of New Haven for discarding the
results of a promotion exam because it had a disparate impact on minority firefighters. 172 The Court held that before the employer may
take such a step, “the employer must have a strong basis in evidence
to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability.” 173
Lewis, one of last Term’s decisions, is another firefighter case
involving the use of an exam. 174 In 1995, the City of Chicago Fire
Department used a written test to hire new firefighters. 175 After administering the exam to 26,000 applicants, the City announced that it
would hire from those who fell into the “well-qualified range,” scoring an eighty-nine or above, and it would not hire those who fell
within the “unqualified” range, scoring below a sixty-five. 176 Those
who scored between sixty-five and eighty-eight were notified that
they passed the exam and were qualified for the position, but based
on projected hiring needs and the number of applicants who scored
higher, it was likely they would not be hired. 177 This practice remained consistent through the next ten rounds of hiring, with the City
hiring exclusively from the “well-qualified” category, which was disproportionately white. 178
The policy was challenged by a certified class consisting of
6,000 African Americans who scored in the “qualified” range but had
not been hired. 179 They claimed that the City’s practice of selecting
only from applicants scoring an eighty-nine or above caused a disparate impact on African Americans. 180 Just as in Ledbetter, the statute
requires that a claim be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the discriminatory
act. 181 The plaintiffs, however, did not challenge the adoption of the
172

Id. at 2664.
Id. at 2677.
174
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195.
175
Id. at 2195.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 2195-96.
178
Id. at 2196. On the eleventh round of hiring, the City had exhausted the “wellqualified” category and began hiring those falling within the “qualified” category. Lewis,
130 S. Ct. at 2196. However, the original plaintiff, an African-American in the “qualified
category,” did not receive an offer during that, or any other, round of hiring and filed suit.
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. The City of Chicago conceded the disparate impact, but argued that its policy was
“justified by business necessity.” Id.
181
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2196 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (West 2010)).
173
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test nor the determination to hire only those who scored eighty-nine
or above until well after 300 days of those acts. 182 The question then
became, “whether a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice . . . may assert a disparate-impact
claim in a timely charge challenging the employer’s later application
of that practice.” 183
The plaintiffs won in district court, with the court finding “the
cutoff score of eighty-nine [to be] statistically meaningless” and rejecting the City’s defense of business-necessity. 184 The City stipulated that the test results had a disparate impact on African Americans. 185 The district court also found that the City’s ongoing reliance
on the test constituted a continuing violation, therefore allowing the
plaintiffs’ claims to be timely. 186 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the only discriminatory act was sorting the applicants into the
categories marking the degrees of qualification. 187 As a result, the
court found that the plaintiffs had not filed their claim within 300
days of the discriminatory act, as required by the statute. 188 The circuit court maintained that the hiring decisions down the line were
immaterial because they were essentially “the automatic consequence
of the test scores rather than the product of a fresh act of discrimination.” 189
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the plaintiffs’ claim timely. 190 The Court concluded
that the failure to file a claim after the adoption of the discriminatory
policy does not preclude new claims whenever the City implements
the decision down the road. 191 Furthermore, the Court distinguished
Ledbetter, saying that Ledbetter does not stand for the proposition
that present effects of prior actions cannot lead to Title VII liabili182

Id.
Id. at 2195.
184
Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22,
2005) rev'd, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008) rev'd sub nom. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 2191 (2010).
185
Id. at *8.
186
Id. at *8 n.5.
187
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) rev'd sub nom. Lewis
v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
188
Id. at 493.
189
Id. at 491.
190
See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2197.
191
Id. at 2199. In light of Ledbetter, this is a bit surprising.
183
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ty. 192 Ledbetter “establish[es] only that a Title VII plaintiff must
show a ‘present violation’ within the limitations period [and] [w]hat
that requires depends on the claim asserted.” 193 Because Ledbetter
was a disparate treatment claim requiring proof of intentional discrimination, in order to be timely, plaintiffs were required to establish
“deliberate discrimination within the limitations period.” 194 However, the Court said that this reasoning does not apply to disparate impact claims because such claims do not require proof of discriminatory intent. 195
The Court recognized the practical difficulties created by its
decision by acknowledging that employers can face disparate impact
claims for practices that have been in use for years, with evidence as
to whether the practice is justified as a business necessity potentially
no longer available. 196 However, not permitting the suit also produces problematic results because an employer could adopt a discriminatory policy, and if no one filed an immediate claim, the employer
could then use that policy indefinitely with impunity, because no one
would be able to challenge even a clearly discriminatory policy.197
Or, equally problematic, a contrary ruling could result in plaintiffs filing “charges upon the announcement of a hiring practice, before they
have any basis for believing it will produce a disparate impact.” 198
Ultimately, the Court concluded, it is not the task of the Court
to decide which interpretation “produces the least mischief.” 199 If
Congress does not like the effects of the statute as written, it can correct the problem. 200 Perhaps this was a veiled reference to the fact
that Congress had indeed known how to undo the damage wrought by
the Court in Ledbetter. 201 Indeed, some commentators believe that

192

Id.
Id. (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558).
194
Id.
195
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199.
196
Id. at 2200 (referencing the briefs from “[t]he City and its amici warn[ing] that [the
Court’s] reading will result in a host of practical problems for employers ad employees
alike”).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200.
201
A footnote in the decision bears on another important lawyering consideration.
Remember, Lewis was brought as a class action. Id. at 2196. Footnote four points out that
the petitioners asserted, and the City did not dispute, that the date of the earliest EEOC
193

2011]

LAWYERING DECISIONS

109

the unanimity of the decision, as opposed to the five-to-four decisions
in Ledbetter and Ricci, reflects the Court’s recognition of Congress
lurking in the wings. 202
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this decision.
Firstly, as to the local effects, Chicago’s firefighter applicant test is
now pass-fail. 203 About 112 of the African-American applicants will
be hired, and estimates for the damages that Chicago will pay range
from $45 million to $100 million. 204 Secondly, the decision applies
not just to public employers, but also to private employers, exposing
them to more claims and larger rewards because disparate impact
claims, unlike disparate treatment claims, typically involve larger
classes of plaintiffs. Thirdly, this decision was written by Justice
Scalia, who also wrote a concurring opinion in Ricci just eleven
months earlier. 205 In his concurrence in Ricci, Justice Scalia questioned the very viability of disparate impact claims, raising the question whether disparate impact claims violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.206 However, there is no hint
of this question in the Lewis decision.
Lewis will also have a profound impact on lawyers. Attorneys will need to explain to their employer-clients how they can
avoid liability under both Ricci and Lewis, since they seem to create
something of a catch-22. Ricci states that an employer can be sued
for discarding the results of an exam that produces a disparate impact,
whereas Lewis subjects the employer to liability for using that exam. 207 Timing seems to be key, with problems arising when employ-

charge filed by a named plaintiff controls the timeliness of the class’ claims. Id. at 2197 n.4.
As to that, the Court said, “We assume without deciding that this is correct.” Id.
202
See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Unanimous Court Allows Firefighter Suit, NAT’L L.J., May
25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 10750605 (mentioning the close watch upon the Lewis
decision because of previous actions Congress had taken after Ledbetter as a result of a 5-4
decision).
203
See David G. Savage, Firefighter Case to High Court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 3646336 (reporting that the new pass-fail test was adopted in
2006).
204
Cynthia Dizikes, Blacks in Fire Exam Hail Ruling, Applicants Didn’t Wait Too Long
to Sue City, Jurists Say, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 10744991.
205
See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2191; Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
206
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207
Compare Ricci, 130 S. Ct. at 2701 (“As a result of today’s decision, an employer who
discards a dubious selection process can anticipate costly disparate-treatment litigation . . . .),
with Lewis, 129 S. Ct. at 2191.
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ers revisit employment practices already in place. 208 However, under
Lewis, prudent employers must review practices adopted earlier to
determine whether they create a disparate impact. 209 Employers may
find themselves negotiating something of a minefield.
One headline announced, “U.S. Supreme Court Effectively
Eliminates Statute of Limitations for Disparate Impact Cases.” 210
While this may be an exaggeration, the decision clearly means that
employers can be sued for employment decisions made years earlier.
Lawyers will need to counsel clients that all employment practices,
both new practices and those that have been in place for years, must
be carefully analyzed in order to consider whether the practice causes
a disparate impact to a protected category, and if so, whether it can be
justified as a business necessity. And this applies not only to the use
of employment examinations for hiring, but to all hiring, screening,
and promotional practices. 211 One employment law specialist advised that as employers assess their employment practices to determine whether they are producing a disparate impact, they need to be
mindful that those assessments may not be protected from disclosure
in subsequent litigation challenging the legality for those practices. 212
This case, together with Mohawk, means lawyers should advise
clients to review employment selection processes in an attorneyclient privileged manner, being mindful that in doing so, they do not
conduct themselves in a way that would amount to a waiver of that
privilege.
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See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2679.
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200.
210
Mr. Employment, Benefits and Labor Practice Group, U.S. Supreme Court Effectively
Eliminates Statute of Limitations for Disparate-Impact Cases, MONDAQ, June 15, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 12144709.
211
For example, lawyers need to counsel employers that their use of social media to
conduct background checks could potentially expose them to a disparate impact claim. See
U.S. Supreme Court Finds Disparate Impact Claims Timely Years After City Adopts Original
&
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LLP
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2010),
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DORSEY
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Some argue that,
“racial minorities, whose presence on social media is disproportionate to their numbers in the
general population, will be more negatively impacted by [employers’] use of social media
. . . in recruiting and hiring.” Id.
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Dionysia Johnson-Massie, Supreme Court Gives Plaintiffs Multiple Opportunities
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MONDAQ, June 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 11951119.
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CONCLUSION

Collectively, these cases raise profound questions about lawyering. The commentators were right—this was indeed the lawyering Term of the Supreme Court.

